Feb 122017

On January 31, GitLab suffered a significant issue resulting in a data loss situation. In their own words, the replica of their production database was deleted, the production database was then accidentally deleted, then it turned out their backups hadn’t run. They got systems back with snapshots, but not without permanently losing some data. This in itself is an excellent example of the need for multiple data protection strategies; your data protection should not represent a single point of failure within the business, so having layered approaches to achieve a variety of retention times, RPOs, RTOs and the potential for cascading failures is always critical.

To their credit, they’ve published a comprehensive postmortem of the issue and Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of the entire issue (here), and must be applauded for being so open with everything that went wrong – as well as the steps they’re taking to avoid it happening again.

Server on Fire

But I do think some of the statements in the postmortem and RCA require a little more analysis, as they’re indicative of some of the challenges that take place in data protection.

I’m not going to speak to the scenario that led to the production, rather than replica database, being deleted. This falls into the category of “ooh crap” system administration mistakes that sadly, many of us will make in our careers. As the saying goes: accidents happen. (I have literally been in the situation of accidentally deleting a production database rather than its replica, and I can well and truly sympathise with any system or application administrator making that mistake.)

Within GitLab’s RCA under “Problem 2: restoring GitLab.com took over 18 hours”, several statements were made that irk me as a long-term data protection specialist:

Why could we not use the standard backup procedure? – The standard backup procedure uses pg_dump to perform a logical backup of the database. This procedure failed silently because it was using PostgreSQL 9.2, while GitLab.com runs on PostgreSQL 9.6.

As evidenced by a later statement (see the next RCA statement below), the procedure did not fail silently; instead, GitLab chose to filter the output of the backup process in a way that they did not monitor. There is, quite simply, a significant difference between fail silently and silently ignored results. The latter is a far more accurate statement than the former. A command that fails silently is one that exits with no error condition or alert. Instead:

Why did the backup procedure fail silently? – Notifications were sent upon failure, but because of the Emails being rejected there was no indication of failure. The sender was an automated process with no other means to report any errors.

The pg_dump command didn’t fail silently, as previously asserted. It generated output which was silently ignored due to a system configuration error. Yes, a system failed to accept the emails, and a system therefore failed to send the emails, but at the end of the day, a human failed to see or otherwise check as to why the backup reports were not being received. This is actually a critical reason why we need zero error policies – in data protection, no error should be allowed to continue without investigation and rectification, and a change in or lack of reporting or monitoring data for data protection activities must be treated as an error for investigation.

Why were Azure disk snapshots not enabled? – We assumed our other backup procedures were sufficient. Furthermore, restoring these snapshots can take days.

Simple lesson: If you’re going to assume something in data protection, assume it’s not working, not that it is.

Why was the backup procedure not tested on a regular basis? – Because there was no ownership, as a result nobody was responsible for testing the procedure.

There are two sections of the answer that should serve as a dire warning: “there was no ownership”, “nobody was responsible”. This is a mistake many businesses make, but I don’t for a second believe there was no ownership. Instead, there was a failure to understand ownership. Looking at the “Team | GitLab” page, I see:

  • Dmitriy Zaporozhets, “Co-founder, Chief Technical Officer (CTO)”
    • From a technical perspective the buck stops with the CTO. The CTO does own the data protection status for the business from an IT perspective.
  • Sid Sijbrandij, “Co-founder, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)”
    • From a business perspective, the buck stops with the CEO. The CEO does own the data protection status for the business from an operational perspective, and from having the CTO reporting directly up.
  • Bruce Armstrong and Villi Iltchev, “Board of Directors”
    • The Board of Directors is responsible for ensuring the business is running legally, safely and financially securely. They indirectly own all procedures and processes within the business.
  • Stan Hu, “VP of Engineering”
    • Vice-President of Engineering, reporting to the CEO. If the CTO sets the technical direction of the company, an engineering or infrastructure leader is responsible for making sure the company’s IT works correctly. That includes data protection functions.
  • Pablo Carranza, “Production Lead”
    • Reporting to the Infrastructure Director (a position currently open). Data protection is a production function.
  • Infrastructure Director:
    • Currently assigned to Sid (see above), as an open position, the infrastructure director is another link in the chain of responsibility and ownership for data protection functions.

I’m not calling these people out to shame them, or rub salt into their wounds – mistakes happen. But I am suggesting GitLab has abnegated its collective responsibility by simply suggesting “there was no ownership”, when in fact, as evidenced by their “Team” page, there was. In fact, there was plenty of ownership, but it was clearly not appropriately understood along the technical lines of the business, and indeed right up into the senior operational lines of the business.

You don’t get to say that no-one owned the data protection functions. Only that no-one understood they owned the data protection functions. One day we might stop having these discussions. But clearly not today.


The designing of backup environments

 Architecture, Backup theory  Comments Off on The designing of backup environments
Feb 072012

The cockatrice was a legendary beast that was a two-legged dragon, with the head of a rooster that could, amongst other things, turn people to stone with a glance. So it was somewhat to a basilisk, but a whole lot uglier and looked like it had been designed by a committee.

You may be surprised to know that there are cockatrice backup environments out there. Such an environment can be just as ugly as the mythical cockatrice, and just as dangerous, turning even a hardened backup expert to stone as he or she tries to sort through the “what-abouts?”, the “where-ares?” and the “who-does?”

These environments are typically quite organic, and have grown and developed over years, usually with multiple staff having been involved and/or responsible, but no one staff member having had sufficient ownership (or longevity) to establish a single unifying factor within the environment. That in itself would be challenging enough, but to really make the backup environment a cockatrice, there’ll also be a lack of documentation.

In such environments, it’s quite possible that the environment is largely acting like a backup system, but through a combination of sheer luck and a certain level of procedural adherence, typically by operators who have remained in the environment for long enough. These are the systems for which, when the question “But why do you do X?”, the answer is simply, “Because we’ve always done X.”

In this sort of system, new technologies have typically just been tacked on, sometimes shoe-horned into “pretending” they work just as the old systems, and sometimes not used at their peak efficiency because of that general reluctance to change such systems engender. (A classic example for instance, can be seen where a deduplication system is tacked onto an existing backup environment, but is treated like a standard VTL or a standard backup-to-disk region, without any consideration for the particularities involved in using deduplication storage.)

The good news is, these environments can be fixed, and turned into true backup systems. To do so, there needs to be four decisions made:

  1. To embrace change. The first essential step is to eliminate the “it’s always been done this way before” mentality. This doesn’t allow for progress, or change, at all, and if there’s one common factor in any successful business, it’s the ability to change. This is not just representative of the business itself, but for each component of the business – and that includes backup.
  2. To assign ownership. A backup system requires both a technical owner and a management owner. Ideally, the technical owner will be the Data Protection Advocate for the company or business group, and the management owner will be both an individual, and the Information Protection Advisory Council. (See here.)
  3. To document. The first step to pulling order out of chaos (or even general disarray and disconnectedness) is to start documenting the environment. “Document! Document! Document!”, you might hear me cry as I write this line – and you wouldn’t be too far wrong. Document the system configuration. Document the rebuild process. Document the backup and recovery processes. Sometimes this documentation will be reference to external materials, but a good chunk of it will be material that your staff have to develop themselves.
  4. To plan. Organic growth is fine. Uncontrolled organic or haphazard growth is not. You need to develop a plan for the backup environment. This will be possible once the above aspects have been tackled, but two key parts to that plan should be:
    • How long will the system, in its current form, continue to service our requirements?
    • What are some technologies we should be starting to evaluate now, or at least stay abreast of, for consideration when the system has to be updated?

With those four decisions made, and implemented, the environment can be transfigured from a hodge-podge of technologies with no real unifying principle other than conformity to prior usage patterns into a collection of synergistic tools working seamlessly to optimise the data backup and recovery operations of the company.

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